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1.	Agents m	ay have		Communis		Quemoys (	page 3).
2. 3.			policy	on Middle	East defe	nse (page 3 lations (pag	
			WE	STERN EU	ROPE		
4.	Adenauer (page 5).	continue	s negoti	ations with	British i	or NATO n	nembers
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Approved For Release 2503/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001700630001-3

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 2

9 Sept 54

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*	Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700630001-3							
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	FAR EAST							
1.	Agents may have directed Communist fire on Quemoys:							
25X1A	The Chinese Communist artillery bombard- ment of the Quemoy Islands on 3 September was apparently directed by Communist agents on the islands							
25X1	light signals were directed during the night to Communist-held Amoy from a hilly area in the southwest part of the larger island.							
	25X1							
	between 3 and							
	6 September three 155mm guns in the same part of the island were moved three times to new positions. Each time, artillery in the Amoy							
	area registered on them in a manner suggesting that the Communists knew the precise location of the guns.							
	Comment: An American officer who recently returned from the Quemoys reported that Communist agents were believed to be present and to be very well informed.  25X1A							
	NEAR EAST - AFRICA							
2.	Comment on Iraqi policy on Middle East defense:							
25X1A	A recent conversation between Iraqi prime minister Nuri Said and American chargé Ireland strongly suggests that Iraq is will- ing to follow Egypt's lead in reference to							
	Western plans for Middle East defense and do nothing on the matter for the present.							
4	Nuri told Ireland that he had no confirmation of reports of differences between Iraq and Egypt on their current proposal for modifying the Arab League Collective Security pact to provide for non-Arab participation. Nuri stated that Egypt is presently reluctant to take any potentially unpopular step, such as joining a defense pact with the West, but that all it needed was a little time.							

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Page 3

Approved For Release 29 3 409/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001700630001-3

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 Sept 54

25X1A	

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700630001-3

Nuri declared that if Iraq and Egypt disagree on Middle East plans, he will revert to "earlier regional defense schemes." The fact that such differences had been anticipated by Nuri and have since been publicly indicated by Egypt, coupled with a continuing vagueness on the part of Nuri as to the precise defense scheme he has in mind, suggests that he is going to continue to bargain and maneuver.

3.	Cyprus	issue	may	impair	Greek-American	relations:

25X1A

Ambassador Cannon believes that any American move which might seem to the Greeks to place the United States on Britain's side on the Cyprus issue would

seriously undermine American influence in Greece. While London considers that the Cyprus question is an internal matter not subject to international discussion, Cannon says it is the cardinal issue in Greek-British relations.

The ambassador believes that the dropping of the Cyprus question from the UN agenda as a result of American influence could have the following effects on Greek-American relations: (1) Greek resentment against Britain might be transferred to the United States, causing a general decline in American influence in Greece; (2) the Papagos government, the first stable postwar Greek government, which is particularly identified with the United States, might be undermined; (3) neutralism might increase; and (4) Greek co-operation in the implementation of the military facilities agreement might be reduced.

Comment: Both Britain and Greece have pressed for American support when the agenda is considered by the General Assembly shortly after its opening on 21 September. The Cyprus question has assumed an overriding emotional importance in Greek politics and rejection of the Greek case, either on the question of inclusion on the agenda or on the substantive issue, will result in widespread resentment and possibly violent reaction in Greece.

9 Sept 54

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 4

Approved For Release 2003/09/02: CIA-RDP79T00975A064700630001-3

## WESTERN EUROPE

	4.	Adenauer	continues	nego	tiations	with	British	for	NATO	member	ship:
25X1A					Ambas	sadoı	Conan	t rei	orts it	is clear	that
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Ambassador Conant reports it is clear that
Chancellor Adenauer is aiming at full West
German sovereignty and membership in
NATO. Adenauer told Conant on 7 September

that he intends to continue discussing with the British their proposal for German entry into NATO, and assumes that the United States will be kept informed. He is thinking of a declaration, possibly confirmed by the Bundestag, limiting the number of German divisions. He would like time to announce these "self-imposed restrictions" before entering a conference with the Western powers; otherwise, he said, the impression might be created that limitations on German rearmament were imposed on him.

Adenauer believes West Germany could gain sovereignty through a declaration by the three Western powers that they will not exercise their rights within the Federal Republic, leaving Berlin still under occupation.

Comment: German coalition leaders are uncertain about demanding renegotiation of the Bonn treaty, which would grant Germany limited sovereignty. They fear that renegotiation would jeopardize French agreement to German rearmament.